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I t  is essential that two questions be clearly distinguished. 
How may I be certain that faith is directed toward the ulti- 
mate, as the religious man claims it to be? How may it be 
known that the propositions which are made in connection 
with that apprehension of faith are true ? Unless the discussion 
takes into account clearly from the outset that two kinds of 
questions are here being asked, nothing but confusion can 
result. We must distinguish between the problem of what 
constitutes evidence for the reality of the religious awareness 
of God, and what for a theological statement describing or 
expounding this religious awareness. For both a knowledge- 
claim is made. The first claim is that knowledge of God is 
valid knowledge. The second claim is that propositions which 
express and interpret that knowledge are also valid. Only 
confusion will result if the distinction between these two ques- 
tions is unclear. We must differentiate between a certain belief 
held within the circle of religious faith and that faith itself. 
What are the criteria by which we judge the certainty of 
these ? The problem resolves itself into two aspects therefore, 
which may be expressed in the following two questions: 
How may I know that my religious apprehension, my appre- 
hension of what I call God, is valid? How may I know that 
statements about the apprehension and its implications are 
true statements ? 
Why do such questions arise ? As to the first, it may well be 
asked why if one is certain that his knowledge of God is valid, 
he should be concerned with showing that i t  is. There might 
be two reasons given for this, first, that one has doubt caused 
in the mind as to a preceding so-called "unshakeable" con- 
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viction, whose certainty then needs buttressing; or secondly, 
that one wishes to show that that claim to know God is not an 
irrational one, but on the contrary a most reasonable thing. 
The presence of doubt, the need to commend his assurance in 
face of that doubt, these are the pressures that lead to the 
quest for the establishment of the certainty. 
Where is the ultimate certainty to be found? Where doubt 
is present we appeal from that which is less certain to that 
which is more certain, so hoping to ground that about which 
doubt has been aroused upon that about which there can be 
less doubt, or it is to be preferred, no' doubt at all. If we are 
sure beyond doubt that b is true, and that being true, it has a 
direct relation (of some sort or other, which must indeed be 
made clear for the desired result) to a, which we have come to 
doubt, then we may be reassured in our knowledge of the 
truth of a. For our question concerning the validity of know- 
ledge of God, the first of the two questions we differentiated 
at the outset, we may fill in the content of a and b more 
specifically. Let a be religious awareness, whose validity we 
have been led to doubt. Let b be the consistent explanations 
made on the basis of a valid religious awareness, explanations 
which have fruitful connections with scientific, moral, aesthetic 
experience. We may seek the reassurance of the religious 
awareness on the basis of the explanations made possible by 
taking that faith as a probable hypothesis, that is to say, as in 
doubt. So to seek reassurance of b we appeal from the less sure 
to the more sure. To establish the certainty of awareness of 
God, one can appeal to experience itself or one can appeal 
away from it to some other grounds, which are considered to be 
more certain than the knowledge given in experience itself. 
These alternatives exhaust the possibilities. Apart from them 
there remains skepticism. To that to which an appeal is made 
for the reassurance of the validity of religious awareness, our 
b above, we shall give the name "evidence." We appeal to 
evidence from that which is lesser known than the evidence, 
to the evidence which we consider better known than that 
from which we make the appeal. 
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Thus evidence is for the unconvinced or for the skeptical. 
Of what relevance is evidence if one is convinced already! If 
one does not know that watch-makers make watches one 
cannot argue to the existence of a watchmaker when one 
finds a watch upon the sands. If one does not know, the 
argument is not convincing ($ace Paley). If one is convinced 
already, how can evidence be used? Evidence is employed to 
assist one to move from lesser to greater certainty; but what 
if one is already as certain as it is possible to be. Does an a 
priori certainty need a $osterior i  evidence ? Is not the question 
contradictory ? 
It may be suggested at  this stage that evidence is not for the 
reassurance of the believer who has come to doubt, but for the 
skeptic that he might come to faith, that he might be convinced 
by appeal to that which he has never known by talk about 
what someone else claims to know. But i t  may well be asked 
how one can convince another of the truth of experience by 
appealing to words about that experience, for words about 
experience can by no means be identified with that experience. 
The words of another about a conviction are not the same as 
being convinced myself. Words about God are by no means to 
be identified with knowing God. A transposition has taken 
place. What then of the evidential nature of such words, 
such transpositions of the "immediate utterances of expe- 
rience" ? 
Let us attempt to set forth the various possibilities of 
approaching the problem of the truth-certainty of the know- 
ledge of God. The alternatives are as follows: First, to 
demonstrate the existence and (at least some of) the attributes 
of God. Secondly, not to demonstrate but to give "evidence" 
or "evidences" for the existence and attributes of God, and 
the certainty of one's knowledge of God. We should not try 
to demonstrate the finality of the Christian awareness of God 
but rather (at the least) to show that it is not unreasonable or 
(at the most) show that it is highly probable. Thirdly, to 
affirm that the final reference point is not open to proof or 
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evidence of a kind analogous to empirical evidence given in 
other instances of confirmation of knowledge (e.g., in physical 
science), but that it carries its own authentication wrapped 
up within it. The knowledge of God is self-authenticating and 
does not require, indeed is not patent of, more than that it 
forbids us to make any attempt at authentication outside of 
the awareness. What authentication there is is a PYZ'OYZ' and 
not a posteriori. There may be a divergence as to the nature of 
the a priori certainty. It might be viewed as beyond doubt. 
I t  may be viewed as not having final and absolute certainty. 
The important point for our classification is that there can be 
no moving from lesser to greater certainty. Whether the 
certainty is final or not there is no more final certainty to be 
found concerning religious awareness than from within the 
context of that awareness. For those who would not claim 
absolute and final certainty would affirm that there can be no 
other, but insist that there is always the element of risk. 
One bets one's life there is a God and stays by the wager. 
Fourthly, then there is the skeptic. There is no demonstration, 
no evidence, no self-authentication. There is risk, and one had 
better make the best of it. But it is a risky dive into further 
meaninglessness. One cannot know, or claim to know that 
knowledge of God is either certain or probable. 
One might add that to these various distinctions correspond 
different approaches to the task of theology, and definitions 
of the relationship between faith and reason. To the first 
corresponds the conception of the task of theology as to give 
proofs for the existence of God. Here theology and philosophy 
are one, To the second theology has the job of supplying 
"evidence" for its contentions. This evidence may be either 
compulsive, as it was intended by "Apologetics" or "Evi- 
dences," or corroborative of that which it points to, but which 
is known apart from the rational constructions of empirical 
evidence. Those who deny that it is possible to prove the 
reality of God or the certainty of faith, and who thus repudiate 
See n. 2 (on page I 96). 
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the high rationalism which sought to demonstrate the ex- 
istence and attributes of God, may indeed be attracted to 
seeking for "evidences" which may be set forth to commend 
the reality of that faith. The "prover" says : I can demonstrate 
the reality of that which was not demonstrated to me by 
reason. The "evidencer" says: I can commend on grounds 
other than those by which I was convinced the reality of that 
of which I am certain. Then there are those whose appeal is 
to the self-authentication of awareness of God. While the 
certainty of reason and logic are contrasted toto cue20 with the 
certainty of knowledge of God, reason may be given a status 
both in preparing for religious awareness and in commending 
it, or it may be simply denied any appropriate place in the 
declaration of faith. To the fourth corresponds the reasoning 
of the radicals which is not really to be classified as theology 
at  all. 
To get at  the heart of the matter we shall distinguish 
between experience and expression. When what is experienced 
is expressed in the logical forms of the linguistic medium 
a transposition takes place. A loss is sustained. Only confusion 
results from considering the expression as if it were the reality 
which i t  is expressing. It is possible that one may focus only 
upon the expression, and, finding all manner of logical pitfalls 
with it, be led to repudiate the reality which is being expressed 
thereby. If one overlooks the possibility that the experience 
might be the only and final court of appeal, the expression will 
have to be considered only on the basis of the canons of logic 
and rationality, that is to say in reference to what is other 
than that which i t  claims to describe. That is why the a f i y i o ~ i  
restricting to empirical realities of statements purporting to 
refer to non-empirical realities is bound to misunderstand 
those non-empirical statements. A "protocol-statement " is a 
translation which may very well render the original 
unavailable. 
Can we say anything meaningful about God to those for 
whom the meaningfulness of God is not already evident (to 
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use a pun) ? To speak about the manner in which language is 
used is not necessarily identical with speaking about the 
reality apprehended in religious awareness. If such reality is 
unknown to the one who approaches the words, purportedly 
about it, they will either be strictly meaningless, or they will 
be made to point in another direction, that is to say the ex- 
pression which is of experience a will be read in the light of 
experience b,  Much that is of use to the theologian may come 
to light if this is done, but he will in the last analysis have to 
object to it as needlessly restrictive and refuse its limits upon 
his endeavors. He will have to say, "If that is all you think 
that I mean by what you interpret me to say, you will have 
misconstrued what I take the referent, the experienced reality, 
to be, or what I know the experience to mean." 
The theologian does not use a language different from that 
which his fellows speak. He has no special language of his 
own. His usage may be different, but the language is not itself 
different. He employs the same kinds of constructions, indeed 
even the same words. So parallels may (and should) be drawn 
between the language. Parallels, some closer and some more 
remote, may be found to the usage of language by the religious. 
Bzd, and this is the nub of the matter, parallels only indicate 
what is like, not what is unlike. To point to the analogies 
between ordinary language usage and the language usage of the 
religious man still leaves open the problem of the referent of 
the theologian's language, and its validity. Suppose we speak 
of discernment-commitment situations of which certain 
language is specially significant, shall we indeed have done 
anything more than to have indicated that "knowledge 
about" the situation is communicable in "I-It" terms ? These 
I-It terms may be translated and made to refer to existential 
situations which cannot be identified with the one most 
important situation they originally purported to describe. 
Why should talk, for example, about "cosmic disclosure" be 
readily identified with talk about God ? The "evidence" which 
is here presented is a particular kind of talk about particular 
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kinds of situations. These situation-responses are then made 
analogous to responses to what is the unique situation of the 
disclosure of God. In the name of empirical reference meaning- 
fulness has been found which does not lead to further know- 
ledge of the referent of such language usage. This referent still 
remains hidden. As symbolic language pointing to the ulti- 
mate, at least for him who is certain of the "encounter" with 
what stands ultimately over against him-God-, will not such 
language be bound to be misconstrued as pointing to something 
more proximate, and its usage as a consequence be only 
partially understood, analogically understood? When a 
symbol (e.g., spirit), is claimed to be drawn from an immediate, 
self-authenticating awareness of God, and is explained in 
terms of some reality or discernment-situation other than the 
one from which it rose (and by definition all else is other), will 
not its intended significance, when made to point to what is 
other than God, be quite effectually devaluated in the process 
of commending itself ? The appeal to the evidential value of 
the symbol is in terms of a particular kind of human 
experience, "empirical" if you will, which particular kind of 
human experience is made analogous, for the purpose of getting 
the benefit of analogous predication, with the experience of the 
ultimate. The appeal is as follows: you know that a discern- 
ment-situation is spoken of meaningfully in rather plain terms 
in the usage of language; experience of God is a discernment- 
situation, the language which is used to describe it is meaning- 
fully used. Thus it cannot be said that religious language is 
meaningless since it has such clear parallels in language which 
describes experiences which no one denies. The suggestion is 
tacitly made that meaningful religious language may indeed 
point to truth. 
A symbol has meaning in terms of experience, the limits of 
which set bounds to the meaningfulness of symbolism. So in a 
"desacralized cosmos" many once-potent symbols have lost 
their power to point. The limits of experience set limits to 
meaningful usage of language. That is why in the discussion 
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of the meaning of the term "God" nothing can be assumed at 
the outset. If we start with the proposition "let God be x , ~  
we then wait to see how, in the particular discussion, the u, 
known gets filledwith meaning. For x could be given meanings 
9, q, or r,  as the experience of the individual was interpreted 
in a particular way, and its significance presented in the light of 
that experience. (In Kant, for example, the symbol x, a 
postulate, stands in the first critique and the second for two 
realities. Starting with a particular interpretation of e . g  , 
rational experience, that is scientific reason, the term ''God0 
is given different connotation from that which it is given when 
the experience is that of moral awareness.) We have seriously 
to reckon with the fact that the term "God" is nothing more 
than aflatus vocis for many of our contemporaries. The symbols 
by which the theist points may have different kinds of meaning 
for the non-believer. The latter may make something of them 
but that may not be what was intended. The believer may 
communciate with fellow-believer through the use of symbols. 
The process is one of "indirect communication" since both of 
them know the reality to which the symbols employed point. 
Thus a meeting-point is provided by the use of symbols 
pointing to the same reality, and thus making possible a 
community between two persons who both know that reality. 
The difference between the believer and the non-believer is 
that the former has at least one more connotation of the term 
"God" than the latter. Thus the symbol "God," if it is at all 
meaningful, will indicate a reality which is known. The 
believer has many uses of the term "GodJ9 in his vocabulary. 
many of which may overlap with those of the non-believer. He 
has one however which does not overlap at all. The meaning 
of that symbol "God" can only be known as the reality to 
which it points is disclosed. Otherwise it remains empty- 
Since the theist claims that the reality "God" whom he says 
' he knows is a living reality (the analogy of life being another 
difficult one to add to the arsenal), he is aware that in the 
usage of his pointers, his symbols, he cannot achieve a direct 
FAITH AND EVIDENCE 1 ~ 9  
communication. Moreover the theist says that his symbols 
serve to indicate a reality that may make itself present through 
them. In this sense words become "Word." Within the con- 
text of "Word," such employment of symbols will then make 
a community of fellowship possible, not on the level of in- 
tellectual understanding of the language involved (for that 
may well be very paradoxical employment), but rather in 
pointing back to the reference which both parties know from 
the a #riori awareness of which we have spoken. Genuine 
symbols are thus bonds of union between those who together 
participate in the meaningfulness to which they point. 
To appeal to "evidence" for the meaningfulness of one's 
expressions one hopes that such an appeal will make more 
plausible the claim that God who is known is the reality He is 
known to be. Our language is meaningful ; we give evidence to 
show that it is; the evidence turns out to be based upon 
analogies, which evidential appeal evidently assumes the 
validity of analogical predication. We have shown, we believe, 
that the claim that our language is meaningful is not the same 
as the claim that we know God. Moreover, the claim that 
religious language is meaningful is based upon canons of meaning 
which may be appropriate in certain realms of discourse but 
not in others. 
It is to be clearly understood that the basis for the em- 
ployment of analogy is in the fact that something has been 
experienced. The procedure of analogical predication cannot 
be employed to establish that basis. I t  is assumed. Thus the 
desire for an empirical reference point for the grourzdbg of 
religious awareness is a misplaced one. The ground is given, 
the reference point for theological discussion is given. Talk 
about, reasoning about, the significance of religious awareness 
is incomprehensible apart from the givenness of that aware- 
ness. Awareness is a priori. Language, "evidence" is a flosteri- 
or;. It is obviously impossible to ground the validity of 
religious awareness in what is a posteriori to it. 
We have intimations that our certainties of ordinary life 
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are not misplaced on the basis of "evidence" and we then 
attempt to speak univocally of evidence as relevant to our 
awareness of God and transcendent realities (La., realities 
which transcend ordinary experience). We may say, for 
example, that the love of a friend which is in doubt may be 
checked by his faithfulness in communicating to us, even when 
it  is difficult for him to do so, that such communication will 
be in accord with our particular circumstances and needs. He 
will not communicate pity when there has been a manifestation 
of what we thought was courage. He will not be silent when 
there is genuine need. This is the way in which "evidenceJ' is 
brought to bear on the problem of the friend's faithfulness. 
The analogy then runs: If God loves you, there will be similar 
things to which you can appeal as evidence. The crux of the 
problem is whether we seek for evidence of that of which there 
is uncertainty, or whether we point to the certainty which we 
know by the examples which we set forth. If the former, then 
we must be prepared to defend the employment of the analog- 
ical usage of the idea of evidence in connection with religious 
awareness. To make a one-to-one co-ordination between 
awareness of that to which evidence is applicable in empirical 
experience, and awareness of what we may call God is, to say 
the least, a procedure which calls for justification by the one 
who makes it. I t  rests upon the failure to recognize that such 
empirical appeal-to "evidence"-is analogical, not univocal. 
I t  may indeed be equivocal. The problem to be faced is whether 
the term "evidence," "appeal to empirical reference," when 
used within the religious frame of reference, is in any sense 
analogical. This is the least that must be done by those who 
employ this kind of approach to the problem of religious 
certainty. 
A point of contact between those who appeal to evidence in 
the manner of the scientific method to establish religious 
certainty and those who say religious certainty is a priori may 
be said to be found in the fact that in both cases, whether a 
priori or a posteriori, the certainty is experienced. For indeed 
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in the appeal to scientific evidence one has to "seeJ) that the 
evidence is evidence and therefore able to produce certainty: 
that is to say, there is at some point an appeal to an intuitive 
grasp of the situation. This indeed may be admitted but it 
does not touch our basic contention that in the case of the 
theist this "grasp,') his intuitive certainty, precedes any such 
attempt to commend i t ;  it is a firiori, whereas the intuitive 
grasp in scientific procedure is a means to bring the inquirer 
(who is in doubt as to the outcome) to a certainty not presup- 
posed and otherwise unobtainable. 
The appeal to immediacy is used in quite a different context 
in the two cases and thus no real analogy exists between 
them. Moreover the theist in appealing to experience from 
initial certainty (prior experience) is not seeking for confir- 
mation or discomfirmation but rather for a way of expressing, 
perhaps commending, that which he knows as certain from the 
outset. 
Is not the fact that one appeals to evidence already an ad- 
mission that the reality for which evidence is sought is less 
certainly known than that evidence which is called in to help 
out that lack of certainty? Evidence is required for that of 
which we are in doubt. To speak of presenting evidence as the 
resting place for our faith, or as the means by which another 
may come to faith, is to point away from that which is the 
object of faith. 
I t  may be said that there is an ambiguity in the usage of the 
term "evidence," that the expression is employed of com- 
mendation where there is no doubt on the part of the one who 
makes it. That this is a possible usage of the term we would 
not wish to dispute. All we are concerned to point out is that 
evidence is directed against somebody's doubt, and is only to 
be understood against a background of antecedent or con- 
comitant doubt. Thus if the subject is in doubt concerning the 
validity of an hypothesis or of an experience, he will seek to 
confirm himself in assurance of its truth by seeking for evi- 
dence. He may not be in doubt, but have to confront the doubt of 
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another. This he may seek to do by appealing to "evidence." 
We have been contending that the procedure is misdirected, 
that it is a t  best an appeal from religious awareness to what 
is transposed from it. If it is the other who is in doubt, there 
may be a similar appealing to evidence in the attempt to 
share the truth-certainty of the awareness which the subject 
has known. But appeal to evidence is in either case a sub- 
stitute for the reality, and can never produce the desired 
certainty. 
It is a well-known, and well-worn problem of logic and of 
law, to determine what constitutes evidence for a particular 
claim. How may the decision be made as to what constitutes 
evidence in any particular instance ? In the nature of the case 
it has to be seen that the evidence is relevant to, very relevant 
to, indeed of utmost relevance to, that for which it purports to 
be evidence. At some point there must be an appeal away 
from the co-ordination of what is said to be evidence and 
that-for-which-evidence-is-evidence to the insight, the in- 
tuition, that this is so, that it is actually "evidence." One sees 
this or one does not. Appeal is made to an intuition which 
may not be further questioned. One cannot after all keep on 
continuously appealing to the reliability of evidence without 
the process going on ad i.nfinitum, and thus opening up an 
infinite regress. There must be a stopping point for which no 
evidence can be given that evidence is relevant. To contend 
that b and c constitute evidence for a is to affirm a priori that 
a relationship exists between them, a relationship of a par- 
ticular kind, a relationship moreover which is set into sharper 
relief by the "evidence" now forthcoming. How does one 
know that ? Not by a process of appealing to further evidence 
but by appealing away from further evidence, that is on the 
basis of an insight that it is so. 
We have contended that the desire for an empirical reference 
point to provide us with religious certainty is misplaced. The 
best that evidence can establish is the high probability of a 
certain fact. The piling up of evidence, relevant to the particu- 
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lar matter to be proved, can at  best bring one to a high degree 
of probability but this never quite reaches certainty. Even if 
the certainty is virtual it is never real. The Christian has never 
been content with a probable God, even if the probability be 
extremely high. At least one must recognize that the implica- 
tion of appealing to evidence is that the a priori certainty is 
insufficient, and the appeal is thus a parley with skepticism. 
If one construes the truths of religion as parallel to the 
truths of science it is not only natural but inevitable that 
empirical reference be essayed. Since, by a process of appeal 
to evidence provided by test situations which he arranges as 
best he knows, or by active observation, the scientist appears 
to validate his assumptions about the structure of things, 
there should be some parallel kind of validation for the claims 
which the theologian makes about reality. So runs the argu- 
ment, but there is a most important distinction between the 
approaches of the scientist and the theologian. The former 
starts with initial uncertainty about certain aspects of reality, 
even if he shelves his uncertainty with a brash hypothesis that 
it must be of a certain kind and viewed in a certain way. 
Within the context of a reality assumed to be of a particular 
kind, e.g., as described by Newton or by Einstein, he then 
proposes hypotheses which, within the kind of reality assumed, 
can be checked, and so validated or invalidated by appeal to 
empirical evidence. The question for which the scientist as- 
sumes the answer is that the cosmos is structured in a certain 
way. Within the limits of this assumption he then sets forth 
his hypotheses to be proved or disproved according to what 
he reckons as evidence for them. 
Now the question upon which the theologian focuses is that 
of the reality of God. He does not assume this, but knows it. 
He does not set it forth as an hypothesis to be confirmed by 
the finding of evidence. Rather he explicates what he knows 
to be certain. In this his view of reason is opposed to that of 
the scientist. He does not set forth with the conjecture that it 
is the ultimate reality that he has known, and then seek a 
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confirmation of this. Rather he knows and then moves to 
make whatever explanations he does about the rest of reality 
on the basis of his certainty. Now it  is important to distinguish 
between the two levels of which we have previously spoken. 
When he speaks abozlt his religious awareness, the transposition 
which has taken place from immediate awareness to speech 
involves that his certainty be expressed in two ways: direct 
witness, "the immediate utterances of faith," and argu- 
mentative exposition. It is in the latter that the immediate 
certainty of faith becomes transposed into the suggestiveness 
and probabilities of reasoning. The theologian's aim is to trans- 
fer, to the best of his ability, to the rational level the cer- 
tainty which he has known on the experiential level. If he is 
asked for "evidence" i t  is in reference to that which he knows, 
not with a high degree of probability, but of which he is 
certain. It is obvious that he will be asked for evidence of 
what he knows by one who doubts the validity of his know- 
ledge. The "evidenceJ) which the theologian may be called to 
give, and which certain of his brood are willing to supply, is 
for the purpose of commending the certainty which he knows 
in face of questions which are raised. That is why there was a 
department of theology once called "Evidences." "Evidences" 
served in the minds of those who employed it to corroborate 
what was known, and then to commend that knowledge and 
its object in face of criticism and doubt. 
What then is to be the theologian's response when he is 
called to validate the context within which his claims are 
being made ? The evidence of the scientist is gathered for the 
discovery and establishment of facts within a particular 
context which he has assumed. The validity of assuming 
that context is left unquestioned by the scientist qzla scientist. 
Philosophy of science, in part, concerns itself with the ex- 
amination of the scientist's assumptions. But philosophy is not 
science. When revolutions take place within the realm of 
science a new conceiving of the context may become necessary. 
Thus Copernicus replaces Ptolemy, and Einstein replaces 
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Newton. For the sake of his researches, the working scientist 
assumes that the universe is structured in such a way that his 
methods of discovery are appropriate. This he does not 
further question. The appIication of his method assumes its 
applicability within this context. This assumption of its 
applicability involves an acceptance of the structure without 
its being further examined. Where such an examination is 
conducted in the interest of science, it is made by the philos- 
opher of science, who is driven from data discovered within a 
theory of the structure assumed as valid to a re-assessment of 
the adequacy of that theory. The scientist qzta scientist is not 
primarily concerned about structure. The theologian is. Now 
the scientist, in the voice of certain scientistic philosophers, 
asks the theologian to provide evidence analogous to, or 
univocal with his own, when the objects of concern are quite 
different. It is obvious that "evidence," even when it is allowed 
by certain theologians, must have quite a different meaning 
in the theological vocabulary from that usage given it by the 
empirical analyst of language or the scientist. What we have 
called into question is the procedure on the part of the theolo- 
gian of appealing to such evidence in the attempt to make 
more certain that than which nothing can be more certain. 
Anselm's critics tried to supplement his approach by appealing 
to such evidence. Thomas, while assuming the ontological 
argument, began with the "evidenceJ' of the senses and 
moved from this to a "proof" of the reality of a certain kind 
of God. That the procedure of appealing to empirical founda- 
tions or evidence for faith is for the theologian a barren one 
when evidence is construed in terms of sense perception has 
become obvious from the discussions with the logical positiv- 
ists. Their restrictive criterion far the usage of reason made 
i t  obvious that the theologian had to assert that the approach 
was quite inadequate to permit him to say what he had to 
say about God, 
When asked for evidence to verify in empirical terms the 
claim that "God loves us as a Father loves his children," the 
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theist is driven to qualify the meaning of the terms as they 
are used in ordinary parlance. Then they continue to be quali- 
fied so that their usage becomes so different from its ordinary 
employment that the assertion is reduced from its original 
brashness to meaninglessness in terms of empirical canom. 
If an assertion is either false or true, it should be possible to 
cite empirical evidence for or against it: if not for it then at 
least against it. But a statement which cannot be verified by 
empirical means cannot be so falsified either. So ran the argu- 
ment. The logical positivists showed us the uniqueness of 
theological statements, as well as their own needlessly 
restrictive definition of reason. Their queries point up the 
assertion made previously that the call for evidence is a 
skeptical one. I t  demands that we establish with greater 
certainty that which is at present of lesser certainty or quite 
in doubt. While this may be necessary for the scientist who 
does not know at the outset whether his conjectured hypoth- 
eses are even plausible until he tests them in an empirical 
situation, it is quite unnecessary for the theologian whose 
2 The term "empirical" is a most misleading one. Basically it 
means "having reference to experience." So in defining it, one in- 
troduces another term, which because of the variety of reference it may 
have, needs itself defining with greater specificity to be at  all useful. 
In a sense all our knowledge is empirical since it is we who have it, and 
it is thus within the limits of our experience. This gets us only to the 
place where we must deny an exaggerated objectivism, which is in fact 
self-contradictory in any case. In the particular instance of this text 
it means "having reference to sense-experience," which reference can 
act as confirmation, its possible absence as disconfirmation. The term 
"empirical" is used theologically of those writers whose method- 
ological procedure requires an appeal to "experience" as opposed for 
example to reason, or authority (viewed in some objectivistic manner), 
as the means for theistic discussion. The attempt is made to isolate, 
analyze, describe that particular religious dimension of experience, and 
then to draw out its implications for discussion of God. Appeal to 
reason, or to authority are not uniquely religious, even if they are 
"experiences." Theological empiricism is the appeal to the known and 
unique reality of faith. Since "evidence" relates to "experience" the 
definition of "experience," that is of the "empirical," will determine 
what kind of "evidence" is admitted as valid, whether the appeal will 
be made to it, or from it. 
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certainty a t  the outset in his relationship with God is un- 
questioned. To read one discipline in the light of the other 
and to dictate the procedures of theological endeavor on 
the basis of scientific methodology is unwarranted and 
misleading. 
I t  should be clear that our case is directed against a 
particular construing of the meaning of "evidence." If we 
seek an analogy for the appeal of the theist we may find it in 
that type of "evidence" which the witness is called to give in 
a law-court. This "evidenceJ' concerns that which has been 
immediately experienced by him. Anything other than this is 
ruled out as out of order. He may only speak that which he 
has known by having immediately experienced it. What he 
has known must of necessity have antecedence and priority 
to that which he speaks. 
This does not mean that we deny reason a place in the 
theological enterprise. I t  is not a matter of "either proof or 
silence." One may point rather than prove. To the mysteries 
of Christian faith it is very often amost complicated procedure 
to point. But the pointing, while it may be very direct and 
compulsive, does not provide the same compulsiveness as that 
of proof, or the appeal to "evidence." The pointing can be 
said to be compulsive only after the reality to which it points 
has become known. The term "compulsiveness" points to the 
experience of the empiricist who, even if he does not incline 
a t  the outset to the conjecture proposed, may indeed have to 
bow to the "facts" which come to light in the process of in- 
vestigation. The initial uncertainty is overcome. The theist's 
certainty is a priori. The scientist's certainty is a posteriori. 
So the theist's talk about religious awareness can only indicate 
the direction in which to look, and the places where not to 
look. The theist's talk is explication, not experimentation. I t  
is report about what is known, not report about what is 
coming to be known, 
The term "evidence" is rejected in the sense used hitherto. 
There is, nevertheless, a way in which it has obviously impor- 
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tant currency in English and in which it may be fruitfully 
employed of religious knowledge. If we say that religious 
knowledge is "self-evident," we indicate an appeal to evidence, 
but in this case the evidence is internal to the apprehending 
self, as that self is in relation to the ground which is apart 
from and stands over against it. I t  is the self-evidence of 
knowing that one is in relationship to the not-self. The analogy 
has shifted from that of establishing of probable conclusions 
about a conj ecture on the basis of the empirically verifiable 
evidence, rather to that of the speaking of the response of 
person to person. This kind of "knowingJ' is what is presented 
in the Scriptural account of certainty of God. The shift is a 
vital one, the knowledge less easy to manipulate, the theologi- 
cal task to be quite differently construed in consequence. The 
claim is made that to construe worthy knowledge only in 
terms of the empirical method is needlessly to restrict it. 
Religious knowledge is more like the knowledge that trust in 
another person makes available than the knowledge that comes 
from an empirical process. What has here been said about the 
a p~ior i  nature of the religious awareness, is differently ex- 
pounded in the various theological traditions. But our for- 
mula "from initial certainty, through a process of transposi- 
tion, to rational explication" could serve as a definition of 
theology which might be applied to different schools of 
theology, e.g., the mystical tradition, the Thomist way, 
liberals, Barth. In  each of these cases there is an initial 
immediacy of awareness (defined differently indeed), and 
Since the form in which we have been expounding theistic cer- 
tainty in this paper has been philosophical, the question may well be 
raised as to what can guarantee the certainty of the knowledge here 
treated against subjectivity. This article has had the limited purpose 
of setting forth thereligious certainty of the theist as a given in relation 
to its subsequent elaborations. Thus we have not examined the means 
by which this certainty comes to be. In discussing this latter we would 
have to raise and address ourselves to the problem of the relation 
between rational, historical, and experiential certainty. We would then 
. 
find ourselves in the midst of a discussion of the relationship between 
faith and history. 
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following this the explication in rational terms of that 
awareness. 4 
4 In this description of the process by which theological statements 
come to be made ("from initial certainty, through a process of trans- 
position, to rational explicationJ' p. 1g8), as in the article as a whole, i t  
has not been our concern to discuss the important issue of the historical 
source of the revelation which, for the Christian theist, constitutes the 
point of departure. I t  may suffice to point out that when a reality is 
manifested through history, that is through happening, we must give 
attention to all the relevant questions that may be raised relative to 
historical knowledge and historical evidence, after having shown that 
such considerations are relevant to the kind of knowledge which we 
have here expounded. The methods of the historian, can take us only 
so far-to the having-happenedness of certain things. The question 
that must further be raised is "What is disclosed through such having- 
happenedness ?" The Christian answer to this question has been a 
trinitarian one. What was disclosed then and there in the first century 
of our era, is continuous, indeed in unity with, what is disclosed here 
and now in the experience of the believer. To stress this continuity 
between past and present, history that took place and history that 
takes place, is what is intended by a doctrine of the Spirit. One can 
only see the inner side of the event established by historical methods 
(e.g., the death on the Cross) as the reality disclosed there ("God was 
in Christ") is now manifest and whose manifestation produces the 
certainty of which we have been speaking. This certainty is thus tied 
to historical event. While knowledge of the Crucifixion of Jesus is not 
identical with faith in the Christ who was crucified-indeed pagan 
historians chronicled the crucifixion-there must be no dichotomy 
between the two kinds of knowledge. That certain things happened 
was in fact confessed from the outset of the church's history as 
integral to faith and to the witness to faith. The decision of faith did 
not take place in a vacuum but within the context of an historical 
frame of reference. I t  still does. 
